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humans and other animals, viii + 218pp. Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 1996.
G ood Natured is an elegant book, easy to read, beautifully illustrated and moderate in tone. Frans de Waal professes an aversion to dichotomy and, while he asserts 
his own views with confidence, he is rarely dismissive of the 
conflicting views of others. Nothing better illustrates this 
characteristic than de Waal's treatment of Richard Dawkins, one 
of the most vociferous exponents of the notion that human 
beings are bom selfish. Although he questions the wisdom of 
anthropomorphising the gene as Dawkins does in the title of his 
book, The Selfish Gene, de Waal agrees with Dawkins that 
genetic self-interest at the expense of others is the basic thrust of 
evolution, but he also argues that, paradoxically, in some species, 
our own included, the selfish gene has given rise to 
unselfishness, to a natural capacity for caring and sharing which is 
the source of human morality.
It is de Waal's contention that there can be no satisfactory account 
of human morality without a consideration of evolution, but it is 
not the main purpose of his book to speculate on how morality 
might have evolved. De Waal's aim is to produce convincing 
evidence that many of the tendencies and capacities underlying 
human morality are to be found in other animals, especially in 
our nearest relatives. He does not claim that members of other 
species should be regarded as moral beings, nor does he 
undervalue our much-vaunted capacity for moral reasoning, he 
simply claims that the foundations of morality have been with us 
from the very beginning. We are by nature 'good' as well as 
selfish.
It may be appropriate, at this point, to reassure any potential 
readers who have an aversion to prescriptive views of human 
nature and who may be deterred by what they perceive as a whiff 
of biological determinism. The human nature of which de Waal 
speaks is remarkable above all for its plasticity. Like other 
members of the primate order, human beings are diverse as 
individuals, variable in their associations and capable of adapting
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to even radical changes in their circumstances. In the human 
species, this last capacity has been so enhanced by advances in 
technology that it seems almost boundless, and de Waal does 
briefly speculate on the possibility that we may be in danger of 
pushing our adaptive potential to the limit. He leaves the 
question open, however, and at no time does he suggest that 
solutions to contemporary problems are to be found in the 
knowledge of our genetic heritage.
Whatever our predispositions are, it is clear that they do not 
provide us with specific norms, for these are far too variable to be 
genetically programmed, but de Waal suggests, nevertheless, that 
it is helpful for us to be aware of our predispositions, particularly 
if we are interested in changing the way we are, for 
predispositions may be consciously reinforced or repressed. Being 
something of an optimist, de Waal is inclined to the view that, as 
in gardening, it is usually better to work with nature rather than 
against it. I, for reasons which will appear later, am less inclined 
to optimism.
Before there can be any discussion of the method employed by de 
Waal to achieve his aim, or any assessment of his success in doing 
so, it is necessary to look at what he regards as the prerequisites 
for morality. He consistently identifies four basic traits under 
which he groups other related tendencies. He is not consistent in 
the order he bestows on the traits, but that may be because he 
considers them all equally important. It might well be argued that 
the list is not exhaustive, and it is also possible to point to 
particular human societies which, for one reason or another, 
have not displayed these traits. It would, however, as de Waal 
says, be difficult to imagine human morality without the 
following tendencies and capacities: sympathy, reciprocity, the 
development of social norms and ways of enforcing them, 
mechanisms for the avoidance of conflict and for conflict 
resolution. It is with the examination of these four traits and the 
presentation of evidence for their existence in non-human species 
that most of the book is concerned.
De Waal describes his writing as alternating between stories, 
theories and hard-won data, and he is careful to anticipate and 
forestall any criticisms that might arise simply from the form 
rather than the content of his work. He points out that the book is 
intended for the general reader, and that a single anecdote,
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particularly one supported by an appropriate photograph, can do 
more to demonstrate a capacity than a thousand words of 
explanation. At the same time, he is at pains to include, either in 
the text or in the copious end notes, details of supporting research 
by himself and others. He also includes considerable discussion of 
cognition in non-human animals and of cognitive aspects of 
behaviour, particularly caring behaviour, but he is frank in 
recognising the limits of current knowledge in this particular 
field. While the work is undoubtedly accessible, and displays no 
lack of rigour, there are; however, certain problems with his 
approach, problems which arise from its very success. At the 
conclusion of the work, the reader is left with a vivid impression, 
not of a scholarly argument, but of a series of vignettes. In one 
way this does not matter. The vignettes, after all, illustrate the 
argument just as they were intended to do, but there is a problem 
nonetheless. The problem is one of anthropomorphism, not de 
Waal's anthropomorphism, but the anthropomorphism induced 
in the reader by the stories he tells.
Most of the stories that de Waal tells are stories of chimpanzees. 
There are stories of other species, including some particularly 
memorable ones of whales and elephants, but it is on chimpanzee 
society that de Waal focuses. This is perfectly understandable. The 
chimpanzees and the bonobos are our closest living relatives. 
According to recent DNA analyses we share over ninety-eight 
percent of our genetic material with each of these two apes, but 
the chimpanzees are to be found in greater numbers and have 
been more widely researched, both in captivity and in the wild. 
There could be nowhere better to look for signs of burgeoning 
morality. The trouble is that they are too like us. It is almost 
impossible to read their stories without seeing ourselves in them, 
and some of us may sometimes not like what we see, as I shall 
discuss later.
While I have been careful not to accuse de Waal of 
anthropomorphism, he is very aware that ethologists are often 
criticised for being anthropomorphic or even sentimental, and 
the same criticism is levelled at all those who take their pleasure 
in the observation or company of animals other than human. 
This means that their observations are devalued accordingly. To 
some extent, the validity of de Waal's thesis depends on his 
success in rebutting, in advance, the likely criticisms, and he 
begins this task by admitting that, in his chosen field of cognitive
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ethology, anthropomorphism is almost impossible to avoid 
because the only words we have to discuss animal behaviour are 
words intended for communication about people. The very use of 
such a term as 'reconciliation' is likely to bring an instant charge 
of anthropomorphism, a charge which de Waal chooses not to 
reject. He suggests instead that such anthropomorphism, if this is 
what it is, can be used heuristically and he quotes, with approval, 
the use of the term, 'critical anthropomorphism'.
There is much evidence of primate behaviour which resembles 
reconciliation in humans, and there are several striking examples 
in this work, including examples of reconciliation brought about 
by the intervention of a third party, a peacemaker. I almost spoke 
of a disinterested third party, but, if the peacemaker is female 
and likely to suffer from male aggression in any conflict, there is a 
clear interest in the maintenance of peace within the group.
In order to justify his use of the word, 'reconciliation', de Waal 
looks carefully at its everyday use, and defines reconciliation as a 
reunion between former opponents following an aggressive 
conflict. It is followed by at least a temporary cessation of 
hostilities. If the observed behaviour matches the definition in all 
respects, then the use of the term is justified, even if the 
underlying process is not the same. If it does not, then a new label 
should be sought.
It is highly likely that the underlying processes are, in fact, the 
same too, for the principle of parsimony posits that if closely 
related species act the same way, then it would be uneconomic to 
assume different processes for similar behaviour. There is, 
however, another form of this same principle which de Waal sees 
as posing a problem for him. The principle of parsimony also tells 
us not to invoke higher capacities if a phenomenon can be 
explained with lower ones, and this presumably means that de 
Waal should not invoke complex cognitive abilities in discussing 
such phenomena as reconciliation behaviour in the great apes, 
especially if these abilities are still a matter of hot debate.
There is no doubt that the two faces of the principle of parsimony 
are a source of conflict for Frans de Waal as a cognitive 
ethnologist with a particular interest in understanding the 
cognitive abilities of our nearest relatives, but I would question 
whether the existence of the problem in any way undermines the
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central thesis of this particular work. It is de Waal's contention 
that animals other than ourselves behave in ways which 
resemble human moral behaviour. He produces much evidence 
that this is so, and the force of this evidence is not diminished by 
equally strong evidence that human cognitive evolution has 
advanced further than theirs. It is still more likely than not that 
our similar behaviours have a similar source, and this is 
particularly true of the members of the primate family. In other 
contexts, de Waal has been quick to point out that our reasoning 
capacities do not drive our actions and that we are more given to 
rationalisations after the event than to careful considerations 
beforehand. It would seem that there are, indeed, good grounds 
for the application of the principle of parsimony, but to human 
rather than chimpanzee behaviour, and if, as de Waal asserts, 
there is growing evidence for mental complexity in the 
chimpanzee, then it may be necessary to invoke higher capacities 
in the explanation of such phenomena as chimpanzee 
reconciliation. If this is the only way a satisfactory explanation can 
be found, then there is no infringement of the principle.
It is not my intention to attempt here any detailed examination of 
de Waal's treatment of the four identified prerequisites for 
morality, but I do wish to look rather more closely at one of the 
four, the capacity for sympathy. There are two reasons for doing 
this. Sympathy is generally regarded as the first of the capacities 
necessary for morality, first both in time and in consequence. It is 
also the capacity most often described as 'natural' in both 
literature and philosophy, and is, accordingly, not infrequently 
ascribed to animals other than humans. It is, for example, the 
only virtue allowed by Rousseau to his hypothetical natural man, 
for, as he says, it is so natural that the very beasts themselves 
sometimes give evident proofs of it.
In his discussion of sympathy, de Waal prefers to use the term 
succorance in relation to animals. He regards this as the 
functional equivalent of human sympathy, and defines succorant 
behaviour as helping, caregiving, or providing relief to distressed 
or endangered individuals other than progeny. Succorance may 
be cross-species and may extend to the long-term care of the 
disabled. Succorant behaviour bears a close resemblance to 
parental care, but is found only in those animals which form 
strong attachments. Even in myth and legend, solitary predators
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are not usually endowed with succorance, although they may be 
its beneficiaries.
There is no lack of evidence for the existence of such behaviour, 
and it is not difficult to explain a continuum of nurturance, 
attachment and succorance in purely evolutionary terms. Where 
there is a long period of infant dependence, for example, there are 
obvious advantages in association. What is far more difficult to 
determine is the extent to which cognitive abilities have a role in 
succorant behaviour in both humans and other animals. It may 
be that some caring behaviour, even in humans, is an automatic 
response to a particular stimulus, while some behaviour observed 
in chimpanzees is of such complexity that it is difficult to explain 
unless it is allowed that these animals are capable of forming 
intentions with the other's interests explicitly in mind. On the 
whole, de Waal seems prepared to regard human sympathy as 
simply an enhanced extension of an original tendency found also 
in other animals. While it is, of course, true that humans may be 
able to provide help more efficiently than could another animal, 
it is also true that our cognitive abilities may be used just as 
efficiently to stifle an original impulse. This fact does not, 
however, diminish the likelihood that succorance and sympathy 
have the same origin.
Although I found little to disagree with in de Waal's account of 
the likely evolution of human sympathy, I did not read it without 
some misgivings, misgivings which were not allayed by the 
account of the development of social rule and systems of reward 
and punishment among primates. If sympathy is associated with 
nurturance and so with females as primary or only caretakers of 
the young in virtually all primate species, then the development 
of rule and order is associated with the male, so much so that de 
Waal gives some consideration to gender differences in relation 
to morality.
This is not an oblique accusation of sexism, for my misgivings 
have little to do with anything that de Waal says. On the contrary, 
de Waal makes every effort to show how differences of social 
organisation and relations between the sexes may be traced to 
differences in environmental pressures, and he is particularly 
good at playing the game of the counter example. Whatever 
behaviour he illustrates, he customarily produces an example of 
contrary behaviour in a related species, for he is interested only in
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establishing broad general tendencies, and is much more inclined 
to stress the human capacity for change than to emphasise our 
inescapable genetic heritage. In any case, little of what he says is 
unfamiliar. His achievement lies rather in producing a mass of 
evidence that serves to confirm some of our earlier speculations 
and discount others, and he would be the first to admit that his 
task is far from complete. The notion of gendered morality is 
certainly not new, for it has been the subject of philosophical 
debate and tragic poetry and drama since the time of the Greeks. 
My misgivings have, in fact, far more to do with the chimpanzees 
than de Waal.
In a very recent publication, Bonobo: the forgotten ape, de Waal 
makes the following observation, which merits quotation here.
Had bonobos been known earlier, reconstruction of 
human evolution might have emphasised sexual 
relations, equality between males and females, and the 
origin of the family, instead of war, hunting, tool 
technology, and other masculine fortes.1
The bonobo is just as intelligent as the chimpanzee and just as 
closely related to our species, but it is very different in its 
temperament and habits. More sociable and vocal than the 
chimpanzee, the bonobo rarely engages in any form of physical 
violence and is most notable for the pleasure it takes in frequent 
and extraordinarily variable sexual activity, a pleasure shared 
equally by females and males.
I do not wish to suggest that we are, or should be, more like 
bonobos than chimpanzees, although some of us probably share 
some of their proclivities, but I would suggest that by focusing o n 
chimpanzee society we run the risk of reinforcing behaviour that 
many of us would regard as highly undesirable. Whatever the 
variety of human behaviour and association, there seems little 
doubt that the ethos of late twentieth century capitalist society is 
that of the chimpanzee dominant male. Chimpanzee male society 
is a hierarchical one marked by status-seeking, high levels of 
competition and aggression, including aggression against females, 
and prescriptive rules which are frequently broken. In 
chimpanzee society as a whole, however, there seems to be a 
precarious balance in the relationship between males and females
1 Frans de Waal & Frans Lanting, Bonobo: the forgotten ape, photographs 
(University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997).
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which promotes the well-being of the group. There are several 
instances in Good Matured of females intervening successfully in 
disputes between males, and of males showing caring behaviour 
and tolerance for the transgressions of the young. While I would 
not suggest chimpanzee female behaviour as a model any more 
than male, I would suggest that we may be in some danger of 
losing the balance necessary for our well-being and even, 
ultimately, our survival. I strongly recommend a study of Bonobo  
to quell some of the misgivings to which I have alluded.
In the first paragraph of this essay, I mentioned that de Waal is 
rarely dismissive of the views of others, and he shows familiarity 
with and respect for the work of a number of philosophers. There 
is, however, one exception to this rule, for de Waal exhibits a 
considerable hostility towards the views of Peter Singer, and, in 
particular, towards the proposal contained in a volume called The  
Great Ape Project 2 in which Paola Cavalieri advocate a 
'community of equals' consisting of apes and humans. It is a 
project which de Waal, who manifestly has great affection and 
respect for the great apes, dismisses, in unusually strong erms, as 
showing blatant anthropocentrism and profound 
condenscension.
I have no wish to embark here on a defence of either de Waal or 
Singer in relation to this matter, but, while acknowledging 
Singer's achievements on behalf of animals, I have always been 
puzzled by his dismissive attitude towards those who are 
interested in them. In the preface to the 1975 edition of Animal  
Liberation,3 he makes a point of disavowing any such interest on 
the part of his wife or himself, and he seems to suggest that 
judgments about animals are best made by those of a similar bent. 
Such people may, of course, claim to be truly disinterested, but 
whether lack of knowledge can lead to sound judgments is a 
different matter. It could probably be said that some ethologists 
have displayed excessive enthusiasm and scant consideration for 
the objects of their investigations. I do not believe that these 
charges can be brought against de Waal, and I do believe that 
studies in primatology, such as his, can help us to gain a better 
understanding of both ourselves and our closest relatives. W e
2 Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer, The Great Ape Project: Equality beyond 
Humanity (Fourth Estate, London, 1993).
3 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (Jonathan Cape, London, 1976).
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may need this understanding to ensure both their survival and 
our own.
On the closing page of the book, De Waal predicts that science will 
soon wrest morality from the hands of the philosophers. I 
interpret this as a rhetorical flourish, but, in any case, some moral 
philosophers of the past fare quite well in the light of de Waal's 
thesis, David Hume, for example, and I doubt if philosophers of 
today will be deterred from thinking about the way things are. 
What can be said is that scientists of de Waal's calibre provide us 
with plenty to think about.
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